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Abstract
The formation of technical barriers to trade (TBT) is the 
result of many influential factors, and the motivations 
have been explained from a variety of perspectives. This 
paper mainly analyzes the motivations of TBT from the 
perspectives of overcoming market failures, technical gap 
and competitions among the interest groups. 
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INTRODUCTION
Because of the characteristics of strong concealment, 
strong pertinence, flexibility and being hard to monitor 
and forecast, TBT is increasingly becoming the main 
policy tool and instrument for countries to conduct trade 
protection. A theoretical analysis on the motivations of 
formation of TBT contributes to a better understating of 
the nature of TBT and its impact on international trades.
1 .   T H E  M O T I VAT I O N  B A S E D  O N 
OVERCOMING MARKET FAILURES
Economic theory suggests that a moderate government 
trade policy intervention can overcome market failures 
and improve the domestic welfare. TBT is set to correct 
the information asymmetry in market economy, external 
effects, a lack of social public goods supply and other 
marker failures.  
1.1  Resolve the Information Asymmetry in 
Trades
Asymmetric information leading to adverse selection is 
a common phenomenon in market transactions. With the 
absence of technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures in the market, producers and 
consumers have a serious information asymmetry for 
the same product; with an inability to determine product 
quality, consumers’ willingness to pay will not adjust with 
the improvement of product quality, enterprises therefore 
choose to take low-quality low-cost competition method 
to make profits, thus the end result of market equilibrium 
is to produce low-quality products (Zhang, 2004). 
Asymmetric information leads to market failures and the 
generation of “lemon problem”. Under this circumstance, 
the government should promulgate strict technical 
standards, conformity assessment procedures, health 
inspection and quarantine measures and other technical 
measures to clearly define the production process 
and quality of products, so as to help consumers fully 
access to the related information of product features and 
qualities, thus cannot only eliminate consumers’ concerns 
on product qualities, protect their rights and interests, but 
also regulate and guide the behaviors of enterprises and 
avoid the generation of “lemon market”.
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1.2  Correct Negative Externalities
Trading activities often produce negative external effects, 
such as the possibility of new plant and animal diseases 
and pathogens brought about by some imported goods, 
which will not only survive in the importing country, 
reproduce and disseminate, and may produce new lesions 
and cause incalculable economic losses and safety risks to 
the importing country. China’s environmental protection 
bureau data show that until 2004, there have been 16 
kinds of alien species which formed serious harms in 
China, infringing as many as 1.5 million hectares of 
forest area annually, of which  more than 1.4 million 
hectares are farmlands, causing a direct economic loss of 
57.4 billion yuan per year (Wang, 2010). On the basis of 
risk assessment, the government’s issuing qualification 
certification on imported products, inspection and 
quarantine of animals and plants, and other appropriate 
technical trade measures can control the negative 
externalities which may arise by imports.
1.3  Solve the Insufficient Supply of Public Goods 
Theory and reality have proved: a simply market 
mechanism cannot produce sufficient quantity of public 
goods to meet social needs. Therefore, an appropriate 
government intervention through regulations, policies and 
other means to induce or forcibly achieve the supply of 
social public goods is the routine practice of governments. 
As for international trade, the performance is that the 
government enacts technical standards, conformity 
assessment procedures, inspection and quarantine 
measures and other technical barriers to restrict foreign 
goods which do not meet the requirements to enter, so as 
to ensure product quality, safety and health protection of 
human, animals and plants, protection of environments 
and other public welfare purposes. Of course, we cannot 
deny that when a government policy intervention 
objectively restricts foreign goods to enter and enhances 
the domestic well-being, it also may form on a trade 
protection of domestic industries.
2 .   T H E  M O T I VAT I O N  B A S E D  O N 
TECHNOLOGICAL GAP 
Although many technical measures help improve product 
quality, protect consumer rights and interests and promote 
international trades, because of the different levels of 
technological development, countries differ in terms of 
regulations, standards, conformity assessment procedures, 
inspection and quarantine systems, therefore increase the 
costs of cross-border flow of goods and form barriers to trade.
2 . 1   T B T  C a u s e d  b y  t h e  G a p  B e t w e e n 
Technological Developmental Levels
In reality, the consumers in developed countries and 
regions have a higher requirement on goods quality and 
performance, and have advanced detective and monitoring 
tools, so their technical regulations and standards tend to 
be more demanding; however, due to the limited level of 
productive technologies, testing and monitoring means, 
developing country’s sense of quality and standard levels 
are often far behind the developed countries, so the high-
tech standards of developed countries often form barriers 
to trade with developing countries.
Taking the important global public health problem of 
pesticide and veterinary drug residues in food products 
affecting agricultural and food safety as an example: 
although numerous studies have already indicated 
that excessive pesticide and veterinary drug residues 
in the body can lead to direct poisoning, teratogenic, 
carcinogenic and many other reactions, due to the 
insufficient studies on food safety and human health 
and a serious lack of productive, testing and monitoring 
technologies, developing countries cannot develop 
appropriate technical regulations and standards to regulate; 
however, based on better public health technological 
supports, developed countries continuously improve 
existing standards of pesticide residues and veterinary 
drug residues, continue to introduce new restricted list 
of pesticides and veterinary drugs, causing a huge trade 
obstacle to the exports of developing countries.
2.2  TBT Caused by Systematic Differences of 
Technological Measures 
Due to differences in national levels of technological 
development and technological developmental path, the 
technical measures based on which are also quite different.
On standard terms, the differences mainly include: (1) 
The contents under standards are different. For example, 
the EU bans the imports of beef containing synthetic 
hormones, but the United States, Japan and Korea, etc. do 
not have this stipulation. (2) On the means of standard, 
some countries tend to set standards by specifying 
product performances, while some other countries use 
only standard to specify product ingredients. (3) Specific 
requirements on the standard for similar product may vary.
Differences in terms of qualification assessment are 
manifested in the following aspects: (1) The standards 
of qualification assessment are different. Qualification 
assessment and quarantine are standards-based, but 
national levels of standards on a similar product may be 
quite different. (2) Qualification assessment systems have 
different contents. Some systems only make type test 
for product samples; some other systems also conduct 
inspection and evaluation on the manufacturer’s quality 
assurance ability; moreover, some systems also implement 
daily supervision. (3) Different status of certification bodies. 
In some countries, certification bodies are government 
departments having the required capacity and reliability to 
carry out third-party quality certification or civil institutions 
authorized by the government, while other countries may 
be dominated by private organizations having relatively 
weak certification capability and reliability; Trust provided 
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by different authentication systems are different, and it is 
difficult to achieve a mutual recognition. A study by the 
OECD shows that testing and certification costs associated 
with different technological regulations and standards 
among countries have accounted for 2% to 10% of the 
production costs of enterprises (Kang, 2006).
In addition, countries’ electronic data interchanges 
(EDI), units of measurement, bar codes, product 
identification labeling requirements and other trade-
related information statements are not consistent and 
corresponding, which also obstruct trades. For example, 
the United States in 1999 required all customs to use 
EDI, otherwise customs formalities cannot be performed; 
appropriate unit of measurement is an important factor 
affecting many commodities, especially equipments, tools 
and dies, etc. to be successfully exported; many countries 
require to print bar codes on commodities within a time 
limit, otherwise imports are impossible, so that the bar 
code system has also become a de facto trade barrier.
Except for the central governments, local governments 
and non-governmental institutions also frequently 
issue many technological regulations whose numbers 
are constantly increased and forms are various. Due 
to insufficient information communication, exporting 
countries often lack an in-depth understanding on 
importers’ technical  regulat ions,  s tandards and 
qualification assessment procedures, and are little 
known of new technical requirements, thereby delay the 
transaction opportunities and hinder exports.
2.3  WTO Rules Provide Basis for Progress of 
Technological Evolution and TBT
WTO-TBT / SPS agreements allow all members, under the 
condition of “reasonable scientific basis”, to develop and 
maintain higher level technical measures than the existing 
international standards and guidelines. The flexibility 
clauses actually provide an important basis for developed 
countries to evolve their demanding requirements in terms 
of safe operation, sanitation and environmental protection 
which are based on advanced technologies to be TBT. 
3.  THE MOTIVATION BASED ON THE 
GAME AMONG INTEREST GROUPS
From the perspective of political economy, the formation 
of TBT is actually a process of public choice, and TBT 
policies can be viewed as a “public goods” characterized 
by non-market decision-making; governments at various 
levels also have their own pursuit of interest, and are 
not the “benevolent governments” in order to maximize 
social welfare; policy decision is a rational decision-
making result among the “self-interested” government 
and various interest groups. The formation of TBT is an 
interest expression and selection result among producers, 
importers, consumers, various interest groups and 
government departments on the basis of their respective 
right resources, is a game under the interest conflicts of 
parties, and is a political deal among the government 
and interest groups, and among various interest groups. 
The last extent to which a policy option can meet the 
requirements of different interest groups depends on 
the disposable powers of different interest groups in 
bargaining with the government.
From the perspective of producers, they want the 
government to set up a suitable standard which is able to 
squeeze out foreign firms so that they can fully occupy 
the domestic market and make monopoly profits, namely, 
producers prefer a protective standard which is higher than 
eliminating negative externalities; from the perspective of 
consumers, they want a minimum standard which is able 
to protect their safety and health, so that they can enjoy a 
decent product to maximize its utility at a low price.
A single people or enterprise is rational, they seek to 
maximize the utility or profit under the given condition. 
When the goal is the same, they will organize themselves 
to take collective actions for maximum benefits. The public 
selective process of TBT is a collective selective process 
under individual rationality, but individual rationality does 
not necessarily lead to collective rationality.
Despite of the large number and large size of 
consumers benefiting from free trades, their interests 
are dispersed and information are asymmetric, it’s easy 
to produce a phenomenon of “free rider” and often 
difficult to organize effectively to exert a pressure on the 
government. But the manufacturers benefiting from trade 
protection are less but have a concentrated interest and 
strong economic foundation. They are easy to organize 
a major impact on government decision-making through 
lobbying and other activities, even to “capture” the 
government’s decision-making process. This is the view 
of collective action proposed by Olsen, who holds that 
if an industry has a stronger capability to overcome the 
“free rider”, it’s more likely for the industry to organize 
a collective action to influence the government decision-
making in order to get more protection. Therefore, those 
enterprises who are less, whose geography and sales 
are highly concentrated, or those industries falling into 
a difficult situation with low growth, high importing 
penetration and high unemployment are more likely to 
obtain a higher protection.
From the perspective of policy supply, when the 
government as the rational “economic man” in the system 
market sets a technical barrier to trade, in addition to 
taking into account the national interests, they also 
consider the demands of various interest groups so as to 
get political donations or political supports. Meanwhile, 
the policy action is also subject to the restriction of 
domestic and international system structures. Therefore, 
despite a higher technical barrier to trade harms the 
interests of a majority of people, when the majority is 
scattered and cannot unit to affect the decision-making, 
but to meet the demands of a few interest groups can gain 
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more revenues and political supports, compliant to the 
nature of a “rational man”, the government will tend to set 
a higher technical barrier to trade.
We often see such cases in reality, the American 
protection case of the sugar industry which is recorded 
by the American scholars Paul Krugman and Maurice 
Obstfeld in International Economics is illustrative. The 
US sugar industry does not have many employees (about 
12,000 people), but the cost of the government to protect 
them is not small (over 500,000 US dollars’ cost for each 
job). They succeeded in persuading the government to 
protect them, because the impaired people of the protection 
policy- ordinary consumers are many but scattered. When 
the loss is at less than $ 5 per capita, it is difficult for 
them to organize to put pressure on the government. But 
for producers, non-protection means the loss of millions 
of dollars, so they have a strong incentive to organize 
collective actions to put pressure on the government, to 
seek protection, and achieve success (Li, 2006).
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